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Abstract: This paper offers a review and conceptual reflection on fears about the Muslim pres-
ence and lack of inclusion into Western European societies and the core features of criticisms of
multiculturalism. It does so by first addressing the misreadings of Islam and multiculturalism in
influential works by Christopher Caldwell and Paul Scheffer. It then addresses the main points
of their critiques by examining the role of the state in Muslim incorporation, framing multicultur-
alism theoretically  in  terms  of  claims-making,  and  offering  evidence of  the  ways  in  which
Muslim claims-making has occurred.
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1. Introduction
How should one read perceptions of the Islamic pres-
ence on European soil? More specifically, how should
one respond to the arguments that Islam is incompatible
with  liberal  democracy  and  that  multiculturalism  pre-
vents, or at least inhibits integration? This review is
intended to offer alternative views to those positions.
It does so by first questioning the essence of the argu-
ments advanced by two sophisticated public intellectuals
—Christopher Caldwell and Paul Scheffer—before mov-
ing on to sketching that alternative.
If  an  observer  looks  at  the  ways  Muslims  were
generally depicted in the 1980s, the foci of concern
were often riveted more on the socioeconomic location
and the ethnic or national origins of the immigrants
than on religion. Writing at that time, William Safran
compared Muslims in the late twentieth century to Jews
a century  or  so earlier.  He noted that  unlike  Jews,
Muslims did not have to contend with the charge of
being a Christ-killer or with the idea of a being per-
petually homeless people.  Safran went on to assert
that,  "Islam seems  too  exotic  to  native  Europeans,
and  the  presence of  its  adherents  in  Germany and
France is too recent, for the majority and for the leaders
of  the  Christian  establishment  to  have developed a
distinct theological hostility or a mass paranoia about
Islam or Muslims". At the same time, whereas Jews
proved to rather quickly improve their economic circum-
stances, Muslims have had a much more difficult time
gaining an economic foothold. The factors contributing
to this include discrimination, low educational levels,
and the impact of traditionalist ethnic cultures which,
for example, encourages large families. It also includes
religion, with questions being raised about the com-
patibility of Islam and modern, largely secular Western
societies. Nonetheless, Safran was convinced that "re-
ligion is a far  less  significant source of  tension and
hostility for postwar Muslim immigrants than it was for
prewar Jewish immigrants" ([1], p. 106).
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That  assessment  was  soon  to  be  revisited.  The
turning point was the Rushdie Affair. The 9/11 attacks,
followed by the terrorist bombing in Madrid in 2004,
the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam the same
year, and both the bombings in London and the Danish
cartoon controversy the following year resulted in a
reevaluation  of  the  significance  of  religion  as  Islam
was increasingly perceived to be a threat to security.
Certainly for many ordinary citizens these events ap-
peared to offer convincing evidence that there was a
problem  with  Islam's  presumed  incompatibility  with
European  liberal  values.  These  perceptions  did  not
spring from nowhere, but rather emerged out of his-
torically-rooted antipathies toward Islam, seen in the
rhetoric of invasion, that, for example, draw a con-
temporary parallel with the siege of Vienna.
That the reality is considerably more complex can
be seen in the analysis of Jytte Klausen of the last of
these events, the publication in the Danish newspaper
Jyllands-Posten  of  a  dozen  cartoons  depicting  the
Prophet Muhammad. The publication resulted in protests
by Muslims in Denmark and other European countries
against the newspaper and the Danish government,
and rioting in numerous Muslim nations. While some
were quick to see these protests as spontaneous out-
bursts reflective of the clash of civilizations, Klausen
argues that this overlooks the political  dimension to
the conflict, which involved, among other things, the
provocative actions of the Egyptian government (the
pre-Arab Spring Mubarak government) as it sought to
curry  favor  with  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  and  with
similar  domestic  political  considerations  in  several
other Muslim nations [2]. 
It  is  often  difficult  to  disentangle  the  sources  of
anti-immigration  animus.  On  the  one  hand,  immig-
rants qua immigrants are often the object of hostility.
They  can  be  seen  as  competitive  threats  and  eco-
nomic  burdens  to  the  receiving  society,  as  well  as
being in various ways perceived to be culturally "dif-
ferent"  in  negative  terms.  Thus,  findings  from  the
Eurobarometer in the early years of the twenty-first
century  found  that  one  in  five  Europeans  in  15
countries surveyed believed that their nation should
enact  repatriation  policies  for  legal  migrants,  while
four out of ten interviewees expressed opposition to
the granting of civil rights to legal migrants [3]. The
difficulty arises when trying to determine the precise
impact of economic versus cultural factors. As an illus-
tration, Thomas Pettigrew noted near the end of the
past century that there is "less French prejudice against
Asians than North Africans and less Dutch prejudice
against Surinamers than Turks" ([4],  p.  84).  Is  this
due to the higher human capital levels of Asians versus
North Africans and because of the colonial connection
with immigrants from Suriname and the lack thereof
with Turks? Or is it because Asians and Surinamers are
not Muslim, while North Africans and Turks are? Or is
there some other reason for these differences?
It is precisely the need to answer these questions
that has led to a growing literature on Islamophobia.
Erik Bleich noted that the term appeared on the scene
in the late 1990s, used polemically by political activists
and commentators. He contends that it entered into
the realm of a social science concept with a 1997 study
funded by the Runnymede Trust on the impact that Is-
lamophobia was having on British race relations. Despite
its  problematic  provenance,  he  concludes  that  it  is
better to maintain the term and shape it into a useful
analytical tool rather than, as some have suggested,
abandoning it. He does so by defining it as "indiscrim-
inate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam
or Muslims" ([5], p. 1582), thereby making it part of
the subset of concepts used to study intolerance.
Reviewing various polling sources in two countries,
Britain and France, Bleich concluded that over a two
decade period running from 1988 to 2008, anti-Muslim
prejudice rose in both countries and that compared to
other religious groups, Muslims are viewed with con-
siderable suspicion. They have, in short, moved down-
ward on the ethno-racial hierarchy. However, they have
not landed on the bottom, for there are some ethnic
groups  that  fare  worse.  These  include  Asians  and
Arabs, which given that these ethnic categories overlap
considerably with Islam, reveals the dual-edged char-
acter of xenophobia. The group that was consistently
located at the bottom of the hierarchy is the Roma—
which is probably little consolation for Muslims [6].
During this time period, right-wing extremist groups
have proliferated and radical right political parties have
seen their fortunes rise in the polls. Three of the latter
stand out for their electoral success: the Austria Free-
dom Party, the Danish People's Party, and the Swiss
People's Party. These and other right-wing parties are
not alike in all respects. What they share in common,
according to Cas Mudde, is the way they frame debates
over immigration issues in terms of "two main themes: a
cultural  threat  (recently  amalgamated as a  cultural-
religious threat) and a security threat (recently amal-
gamated  as  a  criminal-terrorist  threat).  Secondary
themes  include  economic  competition  and  an  anti-
elite/anti-politics narrative" ([7], p. 31). 
These themes are not confined to the radical right.
Indeed, the idea that Islamic values and practices are
incapable of fitting into modern European culture is a
theme that one can find across the political spectrum.
Muslims are perceived to be a problem because they
are viewed as incapable of becoming truly integrated
into Europe. Instead, they are seen as transplanting
their worldview onto European soil. Seen in conspirat-
orial terms, whereby Muslims are engaged in a con-
certed effort to dominate Europe demographically and
culturally, this is depicted as the emergence of "Eurabia".
Stressing the paranoid character of such thinking and
the parallel to the anti-Semitism of a century earlier,
Nasar Meer dubs this "the protocols of Eurabia", and
points  to  intellectuals  such as  Orianna Fallaci,  Thilo
Sarrazin, and Niall Ferguson who have trafficked in these
ideas ([8], pp. 391, 393). We turn to one representative
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example  below,  Christopher  Caldwell,  whom  John
Bowen has described as "the most knowledgeable of
the recent European-Islamic threat writers" ([9], p. 51).
2. Misreading Islam in Europe
The argument is simply stated: the barrier to the in-
corporation of new immigrants in contemporary Europe
is religion, or to be more precise, Islam. Given a relat-
ively small Muslim population that contains a substantial
upwardly mobile segment in the United States, along
with that nation's history of accommodating religious
pluralism, it is not surprising that for those who voice
concerns about the erosion of a distinct form of Amer-
ican  identity,  Islam does  not  loom large  from their
perspective as a source of the problem. This stands in
stark contrast to Western Europe today, as Christopher
Caldwell's  Reflections  on  the  Revolution  in  Europe
attests [10]. His is a far-ranging book that strives hard
to appear impartial,  but a passage in which he ex-
presses sympathy for the message of Enoch Powell's
"rivers of blood" speech and Norman Tebbit's cricket
test of national loyalty is revealing ([10], pp. 147–148).
Caldwell's book can be seen as in many respects
parallel  to  Samuel  Huntington's  Who  Are  We?  The
Challenges to America's National Identity [11]. Caldwell
is not concerned with Turkish guest workers in Ger-
many per se, nor is he concerned with Algerians in
France or Pakistanis in Britain. Rather, he is concerned
with Muslims in Christian Europe—with a further qualific-
ation that Christian Europe has become an increasingly
secular Europe. That being said, he realizes that Turks
were welcomed into Germany in the post-war recon-
struction period as guest workers essential to helping
the nation by remedying severe labor shortages. The
intergovernmental  arrangements  that  defined  the
German guest worker policies viewed these laborers
as  temporary  sojourners  who  would,  when  their
services were no longer needed, return home. As such,
there was no need to raise issues about integration.
Germans had invited Turks in and because they had
done so, they had an obligation to be hospitable to
their  guests.  However,  the guests  have a reciprocal
obligation, which is to refuse to transform themselves
into Simmel's stranger, the person "who comes today
and stays tomorrow". In this regard, Caldwell quotes
approvingly  Hans  Magnus  Enzensberger's  assertion
that, "the guest is sacred, but he may not tarry". From
his  perspective,  Algerians  in  France  and Pakistanis  in
Britain are in this regard no different than Turks in
Germany ([10], p. 71). Neither Caldwell nor Enzensber-
ger  note  that  the  sacred  guest  is  an  ambiguous
presence  even  before  tarrying,  as  George  Bataille's
idea of the sacred being at once sacred and profane
would suggest [12].
Immigration in contemporary Europe is  perceived
to be a significant problem. In an especially revealing
section of the book titled "Civilization and Decadence",
Caldwell warns that "'advanced' cultures have a long
track record of underestimating their vulnerability to
'primitive' ones" ([10], p. 20). Placing the words "ad-
vanced" and "primitive" in quotation marks is an indic-
ation of an ambivalence running through the text. On
the  one  hand,  Caldwell  characterizes  Islam  as  the
product of a great world civilization, but on the other
hand its adherents in Europe are in some unspecified
way less developed than their European counterparts
and a clear and present danger to the continent.
Part of the book addresses issues of marginalization,
self-segregation, poverty, and the social problems as-
sociated with ghetto life. However,  it  becomes clear
that  the  crux  of  the  problem does  not  rest  at  this
level,  but  precisely  at  the  higher  level  of  cultural
structures. Why is Islam a problem? Caldwell argues
that it is because taken as either religion or culture, it
cannot  be  squared  with  the  religious  tradition  and
culture  of  Europe,  which  has  in  the  contemporary
context  increasingly  been  defined  in  terms  of  a
secular,  or  one  might  say  post-Christian  worldview.
Islam is a "hyper-identity", and in the European context
it constitutes an "adversary culture" ([10], pp. 158–
162, 171–173). What this means for Muslim immigrants
is that they have two options: to remain a Muslim and
thereby an outsider—the perpetual Other—or to aban-
don Islam in order to become a European. Caldwell is
convinced that there is no third way. His contends that
Muslims are opting to maintain their inherited culture;
the result is that immigration "is not enhancing or valid-
ating European culture, it is supplanting it" ([10], p. 20). 
Caldwell believes that a factor contributing to Muslim
resistance to becoming European is that multicultural-
ism's spokespersons have encouraged them to preserve
their  cultural  heritages  while  disparaging  all  that  is
European. He writes that, "by now it is almost second
nature for Westerners to assume that anything familiar,
traditional, and Western is to be opposed; and anything
discomfort-inducing and foreign to be protected". The
result, Caldwell wrote in a subsequent essay, amounts
to the Islamic "colonization" of European territory. He
describes what he means in the following passage:
But there is a more important reason [than mere
demographic  accounts]  why  "colonization"  well
describes the influx of the past half-century. It is
that  the terms governing this  transformation  are
set by the immigrants and not by the natives, who
started off not caring, and wound up not daring, to
impose  too  many  rules  on  their  new neighbors"
([10], p. 31).
The  problem  is  that  Muslims  take  their  culture
seriously, while Europeans no longer hold deeply-held
convictions, especially about religion. In making such
a claim, Caldwell implicitly raises three questions: (1)
have states actually been as ineffectual as his account
would  suggest  in  applying  existing  laws  concerning
church-state  relations  to  new  circumstances?;  (2)
what is multiculturalism?; and (3) has there been no
success in integrating Muslims into the public sphere?
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Each question will be addressed in the second part of
this  paper,  after  first  examining  the  misreading  of
multiculturalism.
3. The Multicultural Drama
Critics of multiculturalism abound. Timothy Garton Ash
suggested recently that, "painful though this will be to
those who have expended their academic careers on
multiculturalism, the term should be consigned to the
conceptual dustbin of history" ([13], p. 33). Variations
on  this  theme  have  been  voiced  for  some time  in
intellectual circles, a part of a larger backlash against
multiculturalism. One of the most provocative and ori-
ginal critiques is contained in the work of Paul Scheffer.
In summarizing his ideas, it is necessary to move from
a  controversial  journalistic  essay  that  appeared  in
2000, "The Multicultural  Drama" [14]  to a scholarly
book, Immigrant Nations [15]. 
The essay begins by asserting that the decision to
permit police officers to wear turbans was indicative
of  cultural  confusion.  Scheffer  paints  a  pessimistic
portrait of what he concludes are failed efforts at the
integration of immigrants, with the result being that
even after several generations in the Netherlands, the
offspring  of  immigrants  lag  behind  in  terms  of  so-
cioeconomic success. He also faults his fellow citizens
for their blind allegiance to political  elites who have
convinced the public that resurrecting the old pillariza-
tion policies for new times is the answer to the issue
of immigrant, and particularly, Islamic integration. 
That old scheme was predicated on the assumption
that "the pillars carried the roof", or in other words,
each  contributed  to  national  identity  and  kept  the
nation whole. The problem with Islam is that it has
not liberalized, and in particular resists the idea that
religion and politics are separate spheres. The result is
that the new instantiation of  pillars,  now known as
multiculturalism, is actually a "house of cards" and an
anything goes "cultural of tolerance has now reached
its limits" ([15], pp. 4–7). The two problematic mani-
festations of  multiculturalism are that  the Dutch no
longer appear capable of articulating what their na-
tional identity actually means and secondly they are
content to remain isolated from newcomers, who in turn
are  frustrated  because  of  their  isolation.  The  con-
sequence is that the "multicultural drama that is taking
place is the biggest threat to social peace" ([15], p. 14).
The book is considerably more nuanced than the
article and draws on a century of immigration scholar-
ship. Scheffer is less pessimistic than Caldwell, whom
he depicts as being too "gloomy" ([15], p. 34). This
does not prevent him from advocating for more re-
strictive immigration policies. But he describes immig-
ration incorporation as a long and arduous process,
one that  takes time and occurs  over  the course  of
generational succession. He also appreciates that it is
a two-way street insofar as the receiving society has
to be prepared to embrace the newcomers and to ad-
just in some ways to their presence. He understands
ambivalence  and alienation to  be  characteristic  fea-
tures of the immigrant experience, and that conflict is
both typical and can actually help in the process of in-
clusion.  But  he  does  not  share  the more optimistic
conclusions drawn by scholars such as Leo Lucassen
that the evidence to date provides grounds for think-
ing  that  immigrant  incorporation  today  is  likely  to
follow the pattern of the past [16].
As such, he is representative of intellectuals who
are concerned about national solidarity. The reasons
for Scheffer's  particular  anxiety were evident  in  the
2000 essay. On the one hand, he is concerned that
Islam is resistant to incorporation into secular cultures
and democratic polities, but at the same time he sees
Islam as a house divided. There is a minority that wants
at all costs to avoid the poisoning influences of the West,
but  there are also reform-minded Muslims. Scheffer
voices concern that the reformers have to large extent
failed in their efforts to create a liberal Islam capable
of fitting into European societies ([15], p. 272). 
The Dutch are accused of creating and perpetuating a
"culture of avoidance" ([15], pp. 109–140). They avoid
addressing what it means to be Dutch in an increas-
ingly diverse society, and they avoid engaging in social
relations with newcomers.  Here he qualifies his op-
position to multiculturalism, contending that he is a
critic  of  its  strong version  rather than its  moderate
variants.  However,  without indicating how he distin-
guishes the two, he points to his major complaints:
multiculturalism  encourages  cultural  relativism,  it  is
backward  looking,  and  it  fails  to  appreciate  the
significance of citizenship as a unifying status ([15],
pp. 197–203). 
Critics of Scheffer have suggested that he operates
with nostalgia about feeling at home that encourages
"us"  to  define  what  it  means  to  be  Dutch  so  that
"they" can be held to account if they fail in the task of
becoming Dutch like us. Robert van Krieken concludes
that:
Rather than seeing the Netherlands as an example
of the failure of multiculturalism, it shows how the
Netherlands has an imperfect take on what it means
to be multicultural. Scheffer's book suggests [uninten-
tionally]  that  the  task  is  not  one  of  abandoning
multiculturalism, but of understanding it better, and
engaging it with renewed vigor ([17], p. 469).
4. The State's Role in Muslim Integration
Caldwell and Scheffer think that states have abrogated
their responsibility to integrate immigrants. There are
solid  empirical  grounds  to  challenge  their  position.
One should note at the outset that despite national
differences in church-state relations, there is evidence
of convergence in terms of how their respective legal
systems address matters associated with the status of
religious organizations. As such, religion is viewed, at
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least implicitly, as not simply a right of private indi-
viduals, but as a collective right possessed by a com-
munity of people sharing a religious faith and committed
to structuring their life together according to that faith.
Differences,  however,  persist  in  defining  the  proper
place of those religious communities in relation to the
public  sphere.  During  the  initial  period  of  labor
migration after World War II, European governments
tended to assume that Muslim migrants were temporary
workers.  As  a  consequence,  those  governments did
little to facilitate the integration of these newcomers
into the receiving societies. 
This period was defined by the emergence of what
Jonathan Laurence calls "Embassy Islam", which left
the role of addressing the religious needs of Muslims
in Europe to third parties. Laurence distinguishes two
types of Embassy Islam. The first entails a role played
by the main sending countries in seeking to maintain
connections in order to bolster a commitment to the
nation of origin. A state-sanctioned version of Islam
was  deemed  to  be  a  potentially  useful  antidote  to
ideological challenges to a regime's legitimacy.
The second type of Embassy Islam is less strictly
nationalistic, but instead part of a quest for a pan-
Islamist presence in Europe—with Laurence pointing
to the prominence of both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
"who  fashioned  their  foreign  policy  in  the  guise  of
heirs to the Caliphate" ([18], p. 33). In this variant,
the  political  goals  are  more  ambitious  and  more
potentially challenging to the European host societies.
Laurence  completes  his  account  by  adding  yet  one
more version of Islam in Europe that is not attached
to the  policies  of  sending states,  the  approach ad-
vanced  by  the  proponents  of  Political  Islam.  This
minority, often well-educated exiles who had run afoul
of state authorities in the homeland, found an institu-
tional  home  early  on  in  organizations  such  as  the
Muslim Brotherhood and subsequently in an array of
other organizations with similar goals. Embassy Islam,
especially in its nationalist version, projected itself as
an alternative or antidote to Political Islam. 
With this contextual backdrop, Laurence chronicles
the development since the 1990s of a robust effort on
the part of Western European states to actively pro-
mote the integration of their Muslim minorities, in part
by helping to establish an Islamic institutional  pres-
ence that contributes to, rather than mitigates against,
the  incorporation  of  Muslims  into  European  society
([18], pp. 163–244). He refers to this policy shift as
one that is intent on the "domestication" of Islam in
Europe, which has been undertaken in order "to fash-
ion national citizens who are less globally interlinked"
([18], p. 11).
In  pursuing  this  objective,  he  contends  that  the
seven countries with the largest Muslim populations in
Europe—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Spain, and the United Kingdom—"have followed
remarkably similar pathways to managing their rela-
tions with Islam and they display parallel policy devel-
opments" ([18], p. 15). Of central importance is the
creation of Islam Councils that are intended to shape
state-mosque relations and bring both Embassy and
Political Islam into the fold, in the process redefining
them. Stressing that the outcomes of what has tran-
spired over the two-decade long efforts aimed at do-
mestication are at best imperfect, Laurence nonetheless
concludes that such efforts  have contributed to  ad-
vancing  a  "broader  trend  toward  greater  religious
freedom and institutional representation for Islam in
Europe" ([18], p. 6).
This  view  is  embraced  by  Christian  Joppke  and
John Torpey in their recent comparative study of the
legal integration of Islam in four countries,  the two
largest  nations  in  continental  Europe—France  and
Germany—and Canada and the United States in North
America. They write that, "the institutional accommoda-
tion of Islam in Europe has been more successful than
[many believe]", and moreover the socioeconomic status
of  the generational  offspring of  the immigrants  and
not Islam is "the root problem" accounting for failures
of  successful  integration.  Joppke  and  Torpey,  while
agreeing that a convergence along the lines depicted
by Laurence is occurring, stress that at the same time
nation-specific features remain salient and yield differ-
ent approaches and outcomes. Comparing France and
Germany, they define the former in terms of the "limits
of excluding" and the latter in terms of the "limits of
including". Put another way, France has a problem with
religious freedom, while Germany has a problem with
religious equality ([19], p. 11). The French claim that
laïcité  necessitates the exclusion of religion from the
public sphere. At the same time, Islam has achieved
corporate status in France, placing it in a comparable
position to other state-designated religions, and ad-
vantageously compared to those organizations desig-
nated as cults.
While Germany has not been immune to the issues
associated with the veil, it has been less fraught than
in France, the most controversial case involving a Muslim
teacher. This is a reflection of the fact that religious
freedom is not the central problem in Germany. Rather,
the central dilemma concerning liberalism and Islam in
this case is less about individual religious rights  than
about the corporate status of Islam. Having a long-
established policy of incorporating Christian denomina-
tions,  in  effect,  into the state,  to  date the state has
proven itself to be unwilling to offer Islam similar cor-
porate status. And indeed, it is not simply that Islam
has  not  attained collective  parity  with  the  Christian
churches, but it found itself in an inferior position to
Judaism. This, at least, is the implication to be drawn
from the example Joppke and Torpey cite regarding
the Jewish, but not Muslim, exemption from the provi-
sions of the 1986 Animal Protection Act. Subsequent
judicial decisions have granted in limited circumstances
the right of individuals to obtain meat derived from
ritual slaughtering practices, but this has been defined
in individual and not corporate terms ([19], pp. 63–66). 
130
One could expand on the differences in state ap-
proaches to the integration of Muslims and of Islam
by turning to other case studies in Europe and else-
where, but the point has been made in the French/
German comparison. State approaches will differ de-
pending on the particular interplay of any number of
factors, ranging from established legal understandings
of church-state relations, the size of the Muslim popu-
lation, the origins of that population, the prominence
of Political Islam, the nation's political landscape (e.g.,
how significant  are  right-wing political  parties),  and
public opinion. While considerable attention has been
paid to the role played by differing national models,
the evidence suggests that within nations, policy ap-
proaches  are  less  internally  uniform  and  consistent
than some have been led to believe. 
5. Multiculturalism: Official Policy and 
Unofficial Practice
Timothy Garton Ash is on firm footing when arguing
that multiculturalism has suffered as a consequence of
the  heated polemics often associated with it,  along
with its definitional plasticity and vagueness. But this
is  a  problem  shared  by  any  number  of  concepts,
including what is generally taken to be the antidote to
multiculturalism,  namely  assimilation.  Others  have
pointed  out  that  many  of  the  more  sophisticated
discussions of multiculturalism are framed in terms of
normative theory, presumably thereby lessening their
potential  utility  as  a  tool  of  sociological  analysis.  If
multiculturalism is a social fact, there is a need for a
distinctly sociological account of the phenomenon.
Despite the challenges to the articulation of such
an account of multiculturalism, promising efforts have
been made in developing such a concept. Jeffrey Al-
exander has done so by treating it as one of three
pathways to marginalized minority group incorporation
into  the  societal  mainstream  ([20],  pp.  425–457).
Others have done so by focusing less on multicultural-
ism as a macro-level process and more as a practice
entailing claims-making that is  amenable to analysis
at  the  micro-  or  mezzo-levels.  Italian  theorist  Gi-
useppe Sciortino offered a succinct definition of multi-
culturalism as entailing "political claims expressed by
actors on behalf of a social category" ([21], p. 264).
In a recent article on Islamic religious rights in Western
Europe, Sarah Carol and Ruud Koopmans employ the
concept of claims and counterclaims in examining the
conflictual engagements of Muslims and their opponents
[22]. It is, in short, possible to view multiculturalism
sociologically in two reciprocal ways: (1) as a form of
claims-making by minority groups; and (2) as a way
that  the  dominant  society  and  its  political  system
accommodate to and manage diversity.
5.1. Multiculturalism as Claims-Making 
Peter Kivisto has put flesh on the bones of Sciortino's
thesis  about  multiculturalism as claims-making [23].
He begins by pointing out that claims-making occurs
within the public spaces of civil  society. The claims-
makers are the more or less legitimate, contested or
uncontested  spokespersons  for  a  particular  type  of
social category that he refers to as a "community of
fate", with the claims being advanced predicated on
concerns about the well-being of not only members of
that community, but of the community itself—what he
refers to as the fate of the community. Claims may be
concerned with redistribution, recognition, or some com-
bination of the two. The two audiences to which claims
are directed are the public at large and the state, the
latter being crucial when claims call for specific legislat-
ive actions, court decisions, or policy initiatives. 
Five types of political claims can be distinguished:
exemption, accommodation, preservation, redress, and
inclusion. All are predicated on the idea that the com-
munity of fate has what has come to be described as
a "right to culture". Very briefly, the five types can be
defined in the following way. Exemption refers  to a
demand for differential treatment of the group based
on the conviction that such exemption is necessary if
certain group practices deemed essential  to cultural
identity  are  to  be  permitted.  Differential  treatment
takes the form of waiving the application of certain
laws, rules, and regulations. Accommodation is similar
to exemption in its purpose, but it usually does not
require  waivers.  Rather,  it  entails  finding  mutually-
agreeable  adjustments,  particularly  in  schools  and
workplaces that make it possible for individuals to be
integrated in the societal mainstream while also being
true to their cultural identity. 
In both cases, group members themselves are at-
tempting  to  find  ways  that  they  can  promote  the
continuation of their cultural identity and community.
Neither calls for the intervention of the state or actors
in the larger society to play an active role in maintain-
ing the viability of the group over time. This is precisely
what is called for in the third type, preservation. Here
the fear is that without the proactive support of the
larger society, the future of the community is doomed.
Calls to protect minority languages is a case in point,
as sometimes the claims-makers call upon the state to
fund school instruction in the native language, to create
a bilingual society,  and so forth.  As with the fourth
type, redress, preservation tends to be more contro-
versial  than the first  two types.  Redress  claims are
based  on  the  conviction  that  grave  injustices  have
been inflicted on the community of fate in the past,
injustices that can only be remedied by compensatory
actions. These are claims typically made by indigenous
peoples and ethnonational minorities—and not by im-
migrants. This is a reflection of the argument advanced
by Kymlicka about which sorts of rights are available
to  which  types  of  minority  groups,  with  Kymlicka
contending  that  immigrant  groups  are  not  able  to
avail  themselves  of  as  robust  a  range  of  potential
rights as are the other two groups [24].
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The final claim—inclusion—is one that should sur-
prise critics insofar as they see multiculturalism as en-
couraging  the  balkanization  of  societies.  But  it  is
precisely this type of claim that most explicitly reveals
the incorporative character of multiculturalism. Within
this type, there are two subtypes. The first constitutes
a public appreciation of diversity in general and of the
particular groups. Whereas this type often takes the
form of reaching out or appealing to the public rather
than making demands, the second type can involve
demands, appeals, or both. What is called for here is
an expansion of the boundaries of solidarity by finding
room within those boundaries for stigmatized minorit-
ies  without  requiring  them  to  become,  in  effect,
clones of those already inside the boundaries. 
Inclusion  can  entail  reconfiguring  existing  defini-
tions  of  citizenship  and  of  who  is  and  who  is  not
capable  of  becoming a citizen  on equal  terms with
others. The American civil rights movement is perhaps
the paradigmatic instance of such a call for inclusion.
Citizenship provides both a basis for a shared national
identity  and  for  expressions  of  ethnic  and  religious
diversity. Inclusion can also be seen in other arenas of
social life. Thus, the perceptual and discursive shift in
the  middle  of  the  past  century  from  viewing  the
United States as a Protestant nation to seeing it as a
Judeo-Christian one constituted the inclusion of Juda-
ism under the sacred canopy of American religion—
made possible by shifts in public opinion. 
5.2. Multiculturalism as Accommodation and 
Management
As noted above, the two audiences to which claims-
making  is  directed  are  the  public  at  large  and  the
state. Within both audiences are those who embrace
multiculturalism in one version or another as well as
those opposed to multiculturalism either in terms of
various particulars or writ large, with many being loc-
ated  on  a  continuum  between  the  two  poles.  The
public is inevitably and invariably divided and public
opinion is subject to change, leading to much social
scientific research, the purpose of which is to ascer-
tain the precise breakdown of attitudes in a particular
country at a particular point in time, as well as identi-
fying the cultural, demographic, economic, ideological,
psychological,  and related factors  shaping  particular
attitudes. At issue here are attitudes toward minorit-
ies. While the above makes clear that multiculturalism's
ambit includes indigenous peoples and ethnonational
minorities, our concern here is with immigrants and
religion, thereby excluding from consideration not only
certain groups of claims-makers, but issues related to
topics other than religion, such as language. 
At issue are not simply attitudes toward members
of minority groups, but also attitudes regarding gov-
ernmental policies designed to remedy the inequalities
and marginalization  experienced by  various  minority
groups. Analytically separating attitudes toward minority
groups  from attitudes  about  policies  such  as  those
located under the rubric "multiculturalism" means that
there are four possible variations: (1) negative atti-
tudes toward minorities and opposition to policies; (2)
negative attitudes toward minorities, but support for
policies; (3) positive attitudes toward minorities, but
opposition to policies;  and (4) positive attitudes to-
ward minorities and support for policies. The first and
the fourth appear to need little by way of explanation
since they reflect ideological consistency, the first re-
flecting an exclusionary and intolerant worldview and
the latter an inclusionary and tolerant one. In the first
category, antipathy toward Muslims is matched by an-
tipathy  toward  multiculturalism,  while  in  the  fourth
support for Muslims is coupled with support for multicul-
turalism. The second possibility strikes me as a null cell. 
The third, however, is a possibility, as Paul Sniderman
and Louk Hagendoorn indicate in their study of atti-
tudes regarding Dutch multiculturalism. Their conten-
tion is that most opponents of multiculturalism are, in
fact, tolerant and inclusive. They contend that an un-
intended consequence of multicultural policies is that
they stoke anti-Muslim animus [25]. This conclusion
has elicited criticism similar to that evoked by Snider-
man's earlier work on affirmative action. It is not ne-
cessary to go further into this dispute here, the point
being simply  that  the  possibility  needs  to  be  taken
into consideration.
While there is considerable empirical  research on
attitudes toward both minorities and multiculturalism
—as evident, for example in the Eurobarometer and
European Social Survey—there is considerably less re-
search to date on actions and on patterns of majority-
minority interaction. Given the rising tide of right-wing
extremism and the concerns about violent reactions to
minorities, it is understandable—indeed, appropriate—
that  the  research  that  is  conducted  on  interaction
often focuses on the problems of racism and xenopho-
bia.  However, what this means is that the mundane
patterns of minority-majority relations in everyday life
in increasingly diverse societies is in Europe to large
extent a field of research is only in its earliest stages
of development. 
Far more attention has been directed to the actions
of states that are increasingly charged with the task of
"managing diversity" [26]. State actors in liberal demo-
cracies are guided by a complex interplay of ideological
or philosophical political commitments and instrumental
or pragmatic objectives in contexts shaped by political
party rivalries. It is within this general framework that
state  actors  respond  to  the  challenges  posed  by
heterogeneity and inequality—and react to the claims
made by minority group spokespersons for recognition
or redistribution. While state actors may be motivated
by concerns  for  social  justice  and equity,  they  also
make  decisions  predicated  on  their  sense  of  which
policy  approaches  are  most  likely  to  achieve  social
harmony and equilibrium. One can reasonably assume
that states, when they do subscribe to multiculturalism
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in some version or another, are doing so because they
have concluded that it is in the interest of their polit-
ical system as a whole and is a benefit to their society
at  large  [27].  Furthermore,  one  can expect  to  find
different approaches to multiculturalism predicated on
the type of church-state configurations which influence
the politics of recognition and differing welfare regimes
that impact the politics of redistribution. 
5.3. Quotidian Multiculturalism
Critics of multiculturalism such as Christian Joppke [28]
insist that it represents a dramatic challenge to liberal-
ism, while advocates such as Will  Kymlicka [24] are
equally insistent that a liberal multiculturalism is pos-
sible and viable. Joppke further is convinced that to
speak  of  multiculturalism  means  you  are  speaking
about the state intervening in ways that are designed
to  protect  diversity.  He  finds  the  idea  of  ordinary
people—from  both  the  majority  and  minority  com-
munities—developing relations of mutuality predicated
on a recognition and respect for  difference to be a
"harmless  thing"  that  is  somehow beside  the  point
([29],  p.  861).  Contrary  to  his  view,  the  idea  that
ethnic and religious diversity can exist simultaneously
with a shared common identity, whether that be rooted
in the nation-state and based on the notion of citizen-
ship, or on the more cosmopolitan ideal of a shared
humanity,  points to the significance of the realm of
civil  society.  Indeed,  not  all  of  the  types  of  claims
discussed above necessarily require state action, but
rather can often be adequately addressed within the
framework  of  civic  society.  This  is  certainly  true  of
accommodation and inclusion. 
Whether or not the claims-makers seek state inter-
vention, in making claims they are engaged in civil-
society discourse that can result in negotiated settle-
ments—adaptations—mutually  agreed  upon  by  both
the religious minority and the host society. We look in
the following section at evidence of such multicultural
solutions.
6. Muslim Claims-Making and Negotiated 
Solutions
The third implicit question from Caldwell's book con-
cerns indicators of Muslim integration. The results to
date are mixed, reflecting the inherent challenges of
integrating immigrants and the second generation. We
turn to one particular approach to the question that is
amenable  to  the  language  of  claims-making.  Ruud
Koopmans' Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immig-
rants (ICRI) contains 14 of 23 indicators that directly
address  religious  rights,  and as  the  name suggests
focuses solely on immigrants:
 allowance of ritual animal slaughtering;
 allowance of the Islamic call to prayer;
 the number of purpose-build mosques with 
minarets (calculated per 100,000 Muslims);
 the existence of separate cemeteries or cemetery 
sections for Muslims;
 allowance of burial without coffin; 
 the number of state-funded Islamic schools 
(calculated per 100,000 Muslims);
 the share of costs of Islamic schools that is 
covered by the state;
 Islamic religious classes in state schools; 
 The right of female teachers to wear a headscarf;
 The right of female students in primary and 
secondary schools to wear a headscarf;
 Islamic religious programs in public broadcasting;
 Imams in the military;
 Imams in prisons;
 The existence and prerogatives of recognized 
Muslim consultative bodies ([22], p. 172).
Koopmans frames these indicators from the point
of view of the state and not as claims-making per se,
but if examined from the latter perspective, it is clear
that none entail the two most controversial types of
claims, preservation and redress. Instead, they would
appear to fall into the exemption category (e.g., an-
imal slaughter practices and burial without a coffin) or
inclusion  (e.g.,  the  public  call  to  prayer,  building
mosques, imams serving as military and prison chap-
lains). Many of the claims entail achieving parity with
established  Christian  denominations  ([22],  p.  167).
The particular type of claim at issue for matters re-
lated  to  education  is  difficult  to  ascertain  because
countries have different policies regarding such matters
as  state  funding  for  religious  schools  and  religious
instruction in public schools. 
In Rosmarie van den Breemer and Marcel Maussen's
comparative  analysis  of  state  responses  to  Muslim
claims-making regarding Muslim cemeteries and mosque
construction in France and the Netherlands, the au-
thors  conclude  that  despite  differing  church-state
models  and  differences  regarding  policies  regarding
cemetery ownership,  both  countries  have sought  to
accommodate Muslim claims. They conclude that the
relevant  question  is  not  "whether  governments  ac-
commodate  Muslim  demands  for  recognition,  but
which  demands  are  accommodated,  in  what  ways,
and for  what reasons" ([30],  p.  279).  The context-
specific ways in which claims are made and responded
to has been explored in Sarah Carol and Ruud Koop-
mans' comparative study of six Western European na-
tions  with  substantial  Muslim  populations:  France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, and Switzerland. 
Using a political  opportunity  model, they contend
that those nations that are the most accommodating
will provide the space for minority perspectives within
the  Muslim  community  to  make  more  "obtrusive"
claims. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are
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defined as more accommodating than the remaining
four  countries,  and thus in  the mix  of  claims,  they
hypothesize  that  these  two  more  accommodating
nations will experience a higher level of obtrusive claims.
The primary example they cite is that of supporting
the use of sharia rights  in at least some arenas of
social life, such as in resolving marital disputes. In this
regard, one can point to a similar "obtrusive" claim on
the part of Orthodox Jews seeking to use Jewish law
in  divorce  proceedings.  While  it  is  true  that  the
percentage of Muslim claims in the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom is higher than in the others, it is
also  true  that  the  overall  percentages  for  all  six
nations is low. Whereas the overall percentage for the
six nations is 1.8%, it is 4.7% for the Netherlands and
6% for the United Kingdom. These differences are not
that pronounced, given the small  percentages in all
instances. 
At  the  same  time,  Carol  and  Koopmans  are  no
doubt right in concluding that the religious rights of
Muslims in the "different countries are likely to settle
at diverging equilibria, resulting in a domestication of
Islam around nationally specific legal and institutional
forms"  ([22],  pp.  187–188).  States  react  differently
depending on their particular understanding of church-
state  relations, and in turn Muslims adapt to specific
national  contexts  accordingly.  Bowen  has  illustrated
the differential adaptations based on national context
by comparing how Muslim leaders have approached
the issue of Muslim women seeking a religious divorce
in Britain, France, and the United States [31]. 
It should be remembered that however much Islam
has been the focus of attention in Western Europe,
religious  rights  issues  have  been  raised  by  other
religions, as well. Hindu cremation practices and Sikh
demands  to  be  exempt  from  wearing  motorcycle
helmets to accommodate the turban and to be clean-
shaven in work environments involving the handling of
food are cases in point. And in all instances the question
of the proper role of religion in the public sphere sur-
faces. Jürgen Habermas writes that, "the liberal state
must not transform the requisite  institutional  separa-
tion of religion and politics into an undue mental and
psychological  burden  for  those  of  its  citizens  who
follow a faith". At the same time, he contends that
people of faith entering into a pluralist public sphere
must  engage  in  a  process  of  translation,  one  that
entails a positive "epistemic" stance toward other reli-
gions and worldviews, the autonomy of secular know-
ledge, and the privileging of secular arguments in the
public  arena  ([32],  pp.  9,  14).  Habermas  harbors
skepticism about whether every religion is capable of
embracing this stance, a skepticism that informs his
attitude toward Islam. 
The fear of Islam's critics or skeptics like Habermas
is that the basic tenets of the religion preclude adapt-
ing such an epistemic stance. Taken to extremes, Is-
lamophobia  is  preoccupied  with  Islamist  terrorism,
with a conviction that Islam and democracy do not
mix, and that Islam is bad for women. However, when
anxieties  about  legitimate  concerns are  transformed
into fear, occluded from view is the fact that Islam is
not  monolithic  and  immigrants  identified  as  Muslim
manifest a wide range of attitudes toward the faith—
and to faith in general. Fundamentalism—be it Islamic,
Christian,  Hindu,  or  other  (including  fundamentalist
atheism)—is an impediment to multicultural incorpora-
tion and to the acceptance of religious pluralism. But
the religious mainstreams of the major world religions,
including Islam, are open to living in a multicultural
society. It would appear that at present religion is at
some level a barrier to inclusion in Europe, but only to
a limited extent and, moreover, it does not necessarily
have to be. The process of incorporation has evolved
to include not only the immigrant generation, but also
the second generation who bring greater acculturation
to the receiving society with a willingness to be more
overtly critical of both their parents' cultures and that
of  the  settlement  society.  One  significant  change
underway involves the second generation's separating
of  sending  society  culture  from  religion,  thereby
seeking to  purify  the latter.  What  precisely  this  will
mean is not entirely clear. 
While the situation on the ground is complicated,
the  preponderance  of  evidence  to  date  provides
reasons for guarded optimism about the future. The
vast majority of Muslims who have migrated from ma-
jority Muslim societies to receiving societies in which
they are and will  continue to be a minority religion
have  proven  willing  to  adapt  to  living  in  pluralist
democracies.  And  where  multicultural  policies  and
practices have created a climate in which differences
are not eliminated, but instead respected, a domestic-
ated Islam is  taking root.  This  conclusion  does not
overlook the problems within immigrant communities
—most related to socioeconomic and civic marginaliza-
tion,  residential segregation, and attendant problems
such  as  high  unemployment  levels,  poverty,  and
crime, but also including troubling Islamist minorities.
Nor does it overlook the hostility that Muslim immig-
rants confront and the unwillingness of many in the
receiving societies to extend a neighborly hand. The
future  will  be  determined  by  which  of  the  multiple
social  imaginaries  shaping  the  cultural  dynamics  of
modern Western societies will in the end win out. The
unanswered question is whether it will be shaped by
an expansive or a constrictive understanding of col-
lective social life.
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